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Reality is always more complex than the concepts and categories employed by philosophers to represent it. Especially when these concepts force reality into binary oppositions or dialectical solutions, abstracted and disconnected from the multiplicity and singularity of events, phenomena, configurations of Being and existence. This is particularly true in the case of the conceptual pairing of individual and society, represented in the history of political though by the opposition between “liberal individualism” and “communitarian holism.” Despite frequently criticizing the reductionism involved in this often naïve opposition, scholars have rarely offered an effective alternative to it. A few decades ago, though, Gilbert Simondon attempted to offer a powerful alternative vision of the individual/society relation, using the concept of “transindividuality”. 
As Etienne Balibar has stressed, Simondon’s is an ambitious attempt to define a structure of human sciences through a critique of metaphysical doctrines of individuality, that inevitably lead to the classic dualism of psychologism and sociologism.​[1]​ Beyond classical metaphysics and through modern physics and biology of cognitive processes, Simondon represents one of the most powerful attempts to redefine the reality of the individual in the 20th century.
The first part of Simondon’s thesis, L’individu et sa genèse physico-biologique, was published in 1964, the second part in 1989. In 1966, Deleuze writes a famous review of the first part in the Revue philosophique de la France et de l’étranger in 1966, stating that Simondon presents “a profoundly original theory of individuation implying a whole philosophy.”​[2]​ By praising the influence that modern science can have on philosophy, Deleuze – curiously enough – avoids focusing on the philosophical aspects of Simondon’s work. And basically the very last part of the review is though short, is quite critical, in as much as Delueze calls it “be «a moral vision of the world.”​[3]​ And even at this point before Deleuze’s book on Spinoza, there can be no doubt that having a “moral” vision of the world is probably the worst thing he could say about someone. Thus, even in a review that is sympathetic, and even though the deep influence of Simondon on Deleuze is widely recognized, it is important to keep in mind this early “denunciation”. 
Something else we must consider in decoding the relationship between Simondon and Deleuze is Spinoza.  If on the one hand Deleuze himself declares that probably the only author he invites into his hearth is Spinoza, while on the other hand Simondon only quotes Spinoza to denounce and criticize him, clearly we have something going on in this odd triangle that is more interesting than simply talking about “influences.”  Even when doing hermeneutical (in the sense of going  further than what an author says explicitly) work, we must not overlook what Simondon actually makes explicit: his highly critical reading of Spinoza.  
In this paper I will show the main aspects of Simondon’s ontology, especially those that have clearly influenced Deleuze. But at the same time I will try to point out what is at stake in this conversation and what Deleuze could not have derived from Simondon. I will focus primarily on Difference and Repetition, the most central work in any analysis of the relationship between Deleuze and Simondon.​[4]​ I will try to show first that the line of division between the two authors falls exactly along what we can call a Spinozistic problematic and then to underline the most interesting elements of Simondon’s thought, which can be found – exactly as Deleuze points out – “beyond” Simondon himself.
*
No one would deny that Simondon’s intellectual enterprise—he proposes nothing less than a profound attack on the traditional concept of “substance” and tries to completely redefine ontology—is extremely ambitious. According to Simondon, what has always been considered the only philosophical dimension to be investigated is the world of substances and how they relate one to the other and give birth to the notion of the individual. Substance and the individual have always been the starting point of every ontology. In this way, Simondon argues, constituted individualities have always had ontological primacy over any other possible element, and what has been lost is first, the actual reality of relations, and second, the process of individuation, the process that makes something the thing that it actually is and makes it different from other things. This concept of a “principle of individuation” is not original (being as old as philosophy itself) but it is an idea that Simondon wants to renew and stress.  
For Simondon, individuation must be understood as a process. And, for this reason, it is not the individual, the concept of “individuality” that deserves ontological primacy but, on the contrary, “relation” and the concept of “relationality.” We must substitute, Simondon argues, individuation for the individual, and operation for the principle; we must leave aside the word “ontology” and use instead the concept of “ontogenesis.” Clearly, this is not merely a change in perspective or in point of view. This is a revolutionary effort to set “relation” free from the metaphorical cage in which it has been locked by the traditional concept of “substance.”  As a result, we are led to recognize that relation is not what happens between two substances, but that in fact, relationality “is” reality itself: Being itself appears to be not what “is” (and what eventually happens in the form of relations) but only what “becomes,” in and through relationality.
This revolution has many interesting consequences and corollaries. Knowledge, for example, cannot be seen anymore as a simple link between a subject who knows and an object that is known, but must be seen now as a relation between relations. In the same way, “meaning” in general, as the contents of knowledge, cannot be said to pre-exist the operation of knowledge itself, which is once again a relation of relations. Therefore, for Simondon, meaning can only be understood “in between,” something between and through individuals. Because of the dependence of our vocabulary on the traditional ontology, Simondon proposes a new word—“transindividuality”—to explain this relational ontology and how individuals “cross through” Being rather than being constituted by it.
This also has political consequences related to the interpretation of the place of a particular individual — man — in the world and as regards to other individuals. Basically Simondon distinguishes between yet strictly binds together the two individuations he calls psychique and collective. This is necessary, he argues, to avoid the double failure of psychologism on the one hand and sociologism on the other, meaning by these words the doctrines that assign a fixed (ontological) identity to man and his mind on the one hand and to society on the other, failing to understand, once again, that their reality is first and foremost relational. Therefore, transindividuality explains this double movement of individuation and individualisation. The first movement brings the individual to its physical existence, from a pre-individual being and reality. The second movement – through which individuals continue to exist– is the series of individualisations that corresponds to the action in an environment and with other individuals. Psychical reality and sociological reality are therefore only the multiple relations of the individual with his own pre-individual reality as well as with his environment and other individuals. 
*
Now, this theoretical core of Simondon’s thought seems to describe an authentic immanent ontology of relation, based on the dynamic power of becoming rather than on the static concept of being . My impression, though, is that what I have just described is actually closer to the language and the thought of post-Deleuzian and very sympathetic readers, rather than to Simondon himself. There are in fact aspects of Simondon’s theory that in my view explain Deleuze’s prudent reading and his early critique, and at the same time and potentially more interesting, suggest what we can use of Simondon “beyond” Simondon himself.​[5]​
The postulate of Simondon’s whole theory of individuation is that relation has the status of Being. This problem is anything but original. Here we are completely within the set of questions posed by the ancient Greek philosophers and particularly the pre-Socratic question about if and how Being or non-Being “is.” Although both Simondon and Deleuze paid a great deal of attention to their classic sources, modern scholars have overlooked this important aspect of their work.
Typically, modern scholars start and end with a simple statement of Simondon’s point of departure in his critique of classic ontology, that is to say, his claim that the  conflicting traditions of atomism and hylomorphism have always focused on the result of individuation—the individual—rather rather than on the process of individuation. Both traditions presuppose something (either the atom or the form) rather than explaining the process of formation of this “something.” In focusing on the “process,” Simondon is confronted with the same problem that Heraclitus or Plato or Aristotle had and doesn’t get much beyond it. He thinks this process is a discontinuous path of Being toward individuation. Rather than becoming, beings “switch” from one state of being into another: Individuation, Simondon says, is either complete or it is not. We could say: entweder Sein oder keine Individuation.  Between the physical individuation and the psychic individuation, as well as between psychic and collective individuation there is a discrete sequence of steps, one after the other, as if the biological being of the individual would come before its mental being.
This is a dangerous path, and equally important, it doesn’t help in the task of redefining and grounding a new ontology using the concept of relation and “becoming” rather than being.  Even though Simondon’s language is based on immanence and horizontal relation, it still relies on the traditional binary idea of dynamis/energheia (power/act) as well as a distinction between essence and existence, precisely what Simondon declares he wants to go beyond. Being – Simondon says – is radically pre-individual, is not-one and has to be understood as a “principle”, as separated from every single existing being. Being is pure potentiality, which is never completely actualized in a particular individual. That’s why individuals always live their lives belonging both to the pre-individual and to the individuated.
These tensions in Simondon’s own argument suggest a closer analysis of his relationship with the pre-Socratic tradition. Let us consider his critique of Atomism. There has been a huge debate both in recent years and in Simondon’s time about the atom vis a vis its relation with other atoms as seen by Democritus, Epicurus or Lucretius.  Recently, Jean Salem has suggested the essential reality of the atom as an ontological identity that exists prior to any interaction and therefore to the original vortex. Atoms are progressively added to this vortex, which means that they must preexist. Moreover, if this preexisting reality is not preserved, the original materialistic character of atomism is betrayed.​[6]​
Prior to Salem, Jean Bollack points out that by considering the vortex as an efficient cause or a deus ex machina that derives from matter, scholars have endorsed a post-Aristotelian and teleological point of view. However, as Bollack states, the atom itself only exists in and through its relations with other atoms and so the entire atomic structure of the universe is in fact a “relation of relations.” Matter in the Atomist cosmogony cannot be distinguished from the movement it engenders and from which it is engendered.​[7]​ 
As he does not quote these debates, we can assume that Simondon did not know about them. Yet it is striking that he is not interested in going deeper into the atomistic hypothesis (especially in light of the new nuclear and particle physics which he knew very well). On the contrary, to clarify his idea of the pre-individual, he uses instead the concept of apeiron, Anaximander’s generative infinite or indeterminate, to explain his conception of nature as the “reality of the possible.”
Let us focus on this choice of reference. Anaximander is the first one to use the word arkhé in the philosophical sense of principle, source, and radical origin of everything that is. What is, what has been, and what will be rise from the generative power of the apeiron, which is never the same and which moves endlessly. It envelopes (periékhei) everything and has no quality, for it is totally indeterminate (aóristos). Things are produced from it by way of separation (apókrisis) and ejection (ékkrisis). It is clear that this generative power is not immanent to the things that it produces and rules. It is a transcendent and eternal power that produces a cosmos that is in contrast subject to limitation and death. It is interesting, however, that the apeiron can be seen in a very different way. As there is no reason for a world to happen here rather than there, or now rather than before or after, Anaximander himself supposes an infinity of different worlds. And for this reason he is ranged among the atomists by Simplicius, the 6th century neo-Platonic author of the commentaries on Aristotle.​[8]​
The reference to indeterminacy could have been developed in many interesting directions and could have led Simondon to more carefully interpret the atomist tradition and to give a different meaning to the ontological status of the apeiron.  However – and I find it quite striking – instead of pursuing the possible connection between indeterminacy and atomism, Simondon strongly criticizes the essentialism implied in the concept of atoms, linking it to the hylomorphic hypothesis, and insists on the pre-individual being as an apeiron, with the features of a transcendent principle. Both Simondon and the pre-Socratics try to explain how movement can generate things; how things, from an original totality that is nothing in itself, become something here and now; and, how, fundamentally, from non-Being things move into Being, of the main paradoxes classical Greek philosophy tried to solve. Aristotle solves this by saying—against the pre-Socratics—that Being comes both from Being and from non-Being. This is possible because Being can be understood in two different ways, as power and as act. Being in act comes from Being in power, which is non-Being in act. So Being and individuation follows the path of a teleological transformation of dynamis into energheia.​[9]​ 
Simondon is not completely succesful in overcoming this scheme. His denunciation of hylomorphic theory doesn’t go much beyond the Greeks in saying how we become what we are not, how we know what we do not know, how we leave without having already left, nor does he completely overcome the Aristotelian idea of a dynamis that has to be actualized in an energheia.
Muriel Combes suggests that the “fracture” that seems to divide the pre-individual from actual individualities, as well as vital from psychic individuation, is in fact a tool Simondon uses in order to criticize Bergson’s vitalism.​[10]​ The pre-individual reality that every individual carries on in itself, does not, according to Simondon, belong to the vital, but to the pre-vital.  For Combes, this direct attack against the Bergsonian concept of vital force (élan vital) reflects Simondon’s interest in recognizing, against Bergson’s vision of a continuity between pre-vital and vital, the possibility of breakage, of fractures and ultimately of transformations within Being.​[11]​
This reading is interesting and the critique essential for any ontology of relationality. Yet if it aims to save Simondon from vitalism, it ends by throwing the baby out with the bath water. Beyond – or against – Bergson’s vitalism, it is necessary to think about discontinuity within immanence rather than through transcendence and a fracture between pre-individual and individuated. Following Spinoza – and Deleuze – I wonder in fact if breakage, fractures and transformations within Being can only be thought within a plan of pure immanence and against any form of transcendence.​[12]​
Alberto Toscano perfectly understands the “danger” of speaking about the preindividual in such terms or, as he puts it, of preindividual “as such,”​[13]​ the risk of obliterating the multiplicity and complexity not only of the individuated reality, but also of the individuating operations themselves. This is exactly where, in my view, the Anaximandrean concept of preindividual leads, namely to a “cosmogonic narrative moving from the undifferentiated to the individual, a narrative that would be forced, once again, to adduce transcendent principles to explain the fact of productivity.”​[14]​
Toscano suggests that in order to avoid this danger, the preindividual reality must not be seen as a “creative reservoir” of Being, but only as a “real condition of individuation.” Nor should the preindividual field be considered to contain or anticipate the forms that any individuation may take, and “it would therefore be more accurate to speak in the plural of preindividual fields.” This is clearly one of the most interesting philosophical paths we could follow from Simondon, yet it takes us away from Simondon.  For Simondon, the choice of Anaximander’s apeiron is not metaphorical. 
And I think that this explains also how Simondon fails to understand Spinoza, the early modern author who most successfully challenges Aristotle’s system, and why Deleuze – who has produced one of the most interesting readings of Spinoza – is so careful both  in how he uses Simondon and when he quotes him explicitly.
Let us consider Simondon’s reading of Spinoza. Scholars have suggested an underground connection between them, and there are certainly many elements that suggest an interesting common reading. ​[15]​ Yet we must take into account what Simondon explicitly says in his critique of Spinoza. I believe that Simondon reads Spinoza in the light of the Hegelian interpretation.​[16]​ Simondon’s main thesis about Spinoza can be summarized in 4 points: there is 1) an infinite expansion of the unicity of substance to the whole cosmos; 2) a radical monism of substance which implies the negation of the individual reality; 3) as a consequence the impossibility of Being to become something; 4) finally, a similarity between the monad of Leibniz and the substance of Spinoza in the impossibility of conceiving “becoming:”

We therefore should think of the theory of individuation as a theory of phases of Being, of how Being becomes; this becoming is what is essential.  In fact, thinking about the notion of Substance, we see that becoming corresponds badly with the essence of Being; the notion of accident is not satisfying and it forces philosophers to build systematic but fragile edifices, like Leibniz’s, that do not take into account becoming as becoming, because, once accidents are seen to be comprised in essence--conceived as a complete individual notion-- there is no actual becoming, nor any potential future, for the monadic substance. Regarding becoming, things are not better in the Spinozist system: here, becoming rather than being integrated, is negated (just as the individual himself is negated as a separate being) [author’s translation].​[17]​ 

This was exactly Hegel’s critique of Spinoza in Science of Logic, which Simondon follows in an extremely naïve and limited way.​[18]​ To which he adds further proof of his complete incomprehension of the liberty/necessity relationship in Spinoza, by saying that in every pantheism (and here he clearly refers to Spinoza) the only liberty we can have is the one of the stoic dog, “freely” following the chariot to which it is attached.​[19]​ 
*
Now in the last part, I would like to show not only the peculiar way in which Deleuze uses Simondon  but also some of the interesting things we can find in Simondon, even beyond Simondon himself.​[20]​ There is a beautiful image in Deleuze of the theatre of representation as opposed to the theatre of multiplicities, which destroys identity, both that of the spectator and that of the author. There is no final recognition nor production of knowledge, rather, we are left with problems and continually open questions.​[21]​ In the same way, I would like to propose a series of problems, for which some of Simondon’s intuitions might prove to be useful.
We have already seen, for example, how Simondon completely avoids the debate on the status and reality of the atom in classic atomism.  Paradoxically, it is his silence or naïve conclusions that suggest how important is to push Epicurus and Lucretius to their own limits in order to build an ontology of relations and becoming. Ancient atomists, according to Simondon, look for the principle of individuation within its result and not within the operation of individuation itself, which is another way to say that despite the purpose, there still is a final cause – Being itself – in the atomist’s world. Standing at the crux of different possible interpretations, it is our task – following the problems pointed out by Simondon – to think about the atom not as something pre-existing the relation itself, but something “constituted by” and “constituting the” relation at the same time.
This is exactly what Deleuze does in Difference and Repetition. The ancient atoms – he says, without quoting Simondon – are still too independent one from the other. And their relations still seem to “happen within” a space and a time. A further effort is required by the interpretation of cryptic texts such as the Lucretian In uno tempore tempora multa latent (many different times hidden within one single time).​[22]​ The clinamen, Deleuze suggests, is not the movement of an atom toward another atom; rather it is the reciprocal determination that makes both the encounter and the atoms themselves exist. Moreover, multiplicity does not depend on the concept of unity and its multiplication. We could say that the multiple is one and the one is multiple, but it doesn’t work. The true substantive, the substance itself—Deleuze suggests—is the multiplicity. In this sense, “difference” takes the place of the old dialectic between the one and the multiple. There is a horizontal plurality of beings, meaning that in every single space and time, every being contains and in fact implies a multiplicity of different beings.​[23]​ So we see here the typical Deleuzian “underground” use of Simondon.
Another example is what I would call a conflictual ontology, which can be found in authors like Machiavelli and Spinoza,​[24]​ and, it turns out, in Simondon and Deleuze. As soon as multiplicity and relation take center stage, the idea of “conflict” becomes central. This happens, for example, in the definition of perception and knowledge. Knowing, for Simondon, is not understanding something, not grasping or catching a meaning or a form that already exists outside. Once again both the world and the individual only exist in mutual relation, and knowing – says Simondon in a beautiful image – is nothing more and nothing less than “placing oneself across (se mettre en travers),” so that knowledge becomes a form of resistance to the flux of being: “without this active gesture of the subject within this complex relational system, no perception would ever be possible.”​[25]​
The same problem appears in Deleuze’s fascinating argument concerning the simulacrum and the copy in the section called “difference in itself.” There is a danger, Deleuze says, in invoking pure differences, set free from negative and identity, the danger of falling into a representation of pure soul, meaning the  “representable, reconciliable and federative differences,” that are distant from the “bloody contradictions” of history.​[26]​ Yet – and I find here the attitude suggested by Simondon – there is a process through which problems arrive at their level of affirmation and positivity. When this happens, knowledge is no longer the grasp of appearences, but rather the selection and positioning of problems. These problems

release a power of aggression and selection which destroys the beautiful soul by depriving it of its very identity and breaking its good will. The problematic and the differential determine struggles or destructions in relation to which those of the negative are only appearences, and the wishes of the beautiful soul are so many mistifications trapped in appearances. The simulacrum is not just a copy, but that which overturns all copies by also overturning the models: every thought becomes an aggression.​[27]​

A last example is what Simondon calls the “epistemological postulate” of his own work, which is that “the relations between two relations is itself a relation.” Scholars have correctly pointed out the oddity of this formulation, which seems to be at least self-evident, if not repetition. But this postulate means in fact that the reality of knowledge is the same as the reality of Being itself, which once again is nothing more than a relation. Knowledge exists only on the very same level of the beings to which it is able to relate. It doesn’t open the door to a different (and transcendent) level vis a vis the objects known.​[28]​
Muriel Combes suggests that this is something close to a subversion of the Hegelian formula concerning reality and rationality. In some sense, it is as if Simondon was saying that “whatever is relational is real, whatever is real is relational.” Not only does the relation finally belong to Being, but in some sense it constitutes Being. This abusive appropriation of Hegel’s formula is fascinating. Yet, once again, following Deleuze, it suggests that we might go much beyond Simondon’s formulation. Hegel’s aphorism in fact suggests a transcendence and a primacy of rational over reality: “Was vernünftig ist, das ist wirklich” comes first rather than the other way around. If we read Simondon in this way, we come once again to an idea of ontological “primacy,” which I suggest is the concept we need to challenge if we want to move beyond classical ontology, toward a new ontology of relation and “becoming.” 
Let us consider again Deleuze on the simulacrum.   He virtually rewrites the postulate of Simondon with the same structure, by saying that the simulacrum is the system in which different relates to different through difference itself.​[29]​ Once again it seems an unnecessary repetition. And yet, once again, this postulate has a precise meaning: not only a challenge  to a particular model and an attack against a particular paradigm, but a challenge to and an attack against every model, against the concept of model itself. By way of the simulacrum—Deleuze says—“anarchies are substituted for the hierarchies of representation, nomadic distributions for the sedentary distributions of representation.”​[30]​ 
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